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Discussion Following the Remarks of
The Honorable Donald S. Macdonald and
Mr. William Merkin

QUESTION, ProfessorHenry King, Jr.: Mr. Macdonald, how does
one factor in the question of emotion that exists in terms of the relationship between Canada and the United States? How strong a dimension is
it, how much weight do you give it? Do you think it's so strong that it
would interfere with putting into effect an agreement that was good from
an economic standpoint?
ANSWER, The HonorableDonald S. Macdonald: I think it's very
strong indeed. I think there are two principal elements involved. The
first is the perceived loser. The furniture industry in Canada, for example, can readily identify itself as a loser on any kind of an arrangement
which removes the tariff that is now protecting it. People who have investments and jobs present some clear arguments that they will suffer
from this kind of relationship. They will be organized and they will be
able to campaign against it; that's important.
The second one is much more intangible. It's one that is felt viscerally by many Canadians who do not know what a non-tariff barrier or
contingent protectionism is. They feel threatened by all this. People,
who have no obvious connection with the industries affected, talk about
their concern in this regard. For those who will have the responsibility,
in due course, to come to terms with this strongly felt concept, it's going
to be a very difficult political task. There is a wide-spread visceral concern in Canada that there is something of value at risk in what is otherwise perceived as purely an economic agreement.
QUESTION, Professor King: Mr. Merkin, one of the countries I
assume would be affected adversely by a U.S.-Canada agreement would
be Japan. Has there been any reaction on the part of Japan to these
initiatives?
ANSWER, Mr. Merkin: We heard from a number of our trading
partners as soon as this came out in 1983. The Japanese have been the
strongest in warning about the implications, for the multilateral system,
of bilateralism.
We focus too much on winners and losers-on one side of the border or the other. I think what we're going to see is some areas where
both sides come out ahead to the disadvantage of third countries. If we
reduce bilateral barriers and make it easier for North American companies to compete, who is that going to effect?
It will effect those who are still facing barriers, especially procure-

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:19 1985]

ment barriers. If we just open up the U.S. procurement market to the
Canadians, by giving them national treatment, that won't do a thing for
the Japanese. But, it would be very difficult for Japan to complain too
much, given the political sensitivities right now.
QUESTION, Professor King: These sectors are seen as units. Can
you split the sectors? In other words, is there any division of products
between sectors by which you can reach a compromise?
ANSWER, Mr. Merkin: Yes, there are such divisions. For example,
in the paper industry there are subsectors. The Canadian industry has
something to gain in some product areas; the U.S. industry has something to gain in others. That might help with the difficulty of a balance
within a sector, but it still doesn't address the GATT question, which is
the biggest roadblock in the sectoral approach.
QUESTION, Mr. Philip Trezise: Mr. Merkin, you're perfectly correct in your remarks about the Congress and its power in the trade field,
but I did not hear you mention the provision in the 1984 bill that, in
effect, invites Canada to come forward with a proposal for free trade. Is
this an open invitation?
ANSWER, Mr. Merkin: That's about all it is, an invitation. The
important provision of the bill is that it allows the Administration to
utilize the "fast track" approval procedures of the Congress once such a
proposal has been made. That is, if a trade agreement is brought in
under section 102 of the 1974 Trade Act, Congress has to act upon it
within a set period of time and cannot amend the agreement.
This can be used in a bilateral U.S.-Canada arrangement. There is a
provision in the bill enacted last year that allows us to go to the Congress
sixty days before we want to enter negotiations and inform them of our
interest. We go to the Ways and Means Committee in the House and the
Finance Committee in the Senate. If they do not disapprove of entering
into negotiations, then we can use the "fast track." But Congress, both
in its negative approval process before negotiations are entered, and later,
when an agreement is brought back for final approval, can question
about all the sensitive points of the relationship.
QUESTION,ProfessorRobert Hudec: Mr. Merkin, it's been said for
many years that the reason GATT Article XXIV requires governments
which have a free-trade area or a customs union to include in them substantially all commerce is that, if they are allowed to pick sector by sector, the ones picked will inevitably be the ones which involve trade
diversion-where one country will gain at the expense of a third country.
Could you give us a general idea of the context to which trade diversion-the losses to third countries or gains at their expense-has been
perceived?
ANSWER, Mr. Merkin: I can answer that very simply: we haven't
looked at it. For the most part, we have been wrestling with very narrow
sectors, trying to identify the barriers and to gauge the impact bilaterally.
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We have gotten some advice from the International Trade Commission
on what they think the economic impact will be on a series of sectors, but
so far we have not done much consideration of third country diversion. I
think our trading partners are thinking about that more than we are.
QUESTION, Professor King: What about the role of technology in
the sectoral area? It seems that once you establish a superiority in the
high technology industry on one side of the border then, since it has a
competitive edge, the industries on the other side tend to have difficulty
getting the research money to develop new technology.
ANSWER, The HonorableDonald S. Macdonald: I think certainly
one of the factors that has developed recently is that technology has very
substantially discounted the nature of comparative advantage that a
country like Canada would have. Substitution and downsizing have been
needed to meet the drop in the demand for some of Canada's natural
products as a result of the impact of technology. In terms of relations
with the United States, this has to be a matter of concern from Canada's
standpoint.
Apart from the technological strength of the United States, and the
substantial financial assets brought to bear within the university system
for technological research, there has to be concern that with a very large
defense budget, American manufacturers have a built-in comparative advantage. What is also of great concern is the effort by the American
Administration, either for security or for trade-advantage reasons, to
confine technological research to American firms.
QUESTION, Mr. PeterSuchman: One issue that is never really addressed directly is how an agreement, whether sectoral or comprehensive, affects the multilateral trading system. The U.S. Trade
Representative's position has been that if we can't make headway multilaterally, then do it bilaterally. It seems this is a premise that needs to be
more fully debated, whether it's in a U.S.-Canadian, U.S.-Mexican or
U.S.-Asian country context.
Is it really valid to say that this is all going to lead to multilateral
liberalization in the end? Maybe we're going in the opposite direction,
towards regionalism.
ANSWER, Mr. Merkin: Assuming the Administration line hasn't
changed, we still believe that we can be moving in tandem. The basic
problem we're having with the multilateral approach is that we're dealing with over a hundred countries which are now part of the GATT. To
get an agreement between that many countries to move in any particular
direction entails the least common denominator concept-maybe we will
have a little movement there, after years and years of negotiation.
Now we have a situation where the two largest trading countries in
the world basically are prepared to see all the barriers between the two
countries reduced and eliminated. That was clear from the Shamrock
(Quebec) Summit. There is a political willingness to move. How and
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when still remains to be sorted out, but it is the Administration's position
that we should be taking advantage of this, because we'll never be able to
go as far as we're prepared to go now in a multilateral agreement. And,
by getting the two largest trading partners moving in this direction, it's
got to get the attention of other countries.
The Japanese have been saying for years that they're prepared to
match what everybody else is doing; this will put a little pressure on
them. I don't know if it's going to have any impact on Europe, but I
don't think they could ignore it. It's not our feeling that we are going to
regionalism. The other countries are going to have to join in eventually;
it's going to have to have an impact on the multilateral process.
ANSWER, The Honorable Donald S. Macdonald: Multilateral arrangements have been important to Canada since 1947, since the GATT,
and they continue to be so. The Canadian perception, though, is a little
different from the American.
In 1947, when the GATT was negotiated, there were a limited
number of countries of relatively the same size (except for the United
States). That was a multilateral community in which, from the Canadian
standpoint, there was opportunity of negotiating some advantages. Two
important things have happened since: the emergence of Japan, which
wasn't even at the table in Geneva and Havana; and the European Economic Community.
GATT has ceased to be the type of multilateral organization it was.
As far as Canada is concerned, there are two or three big battalions
which are inclined to make the deals and then come back and tell us
what the results were. Not only do we have difficulty getting our issues
on the agenda, but after a deal has been made we hear: "well, we took
care of this with the United States, is that OK with you?" That's not a
negotiating process, if you're a Canadian with a different viewpoint. Are
we abandoning the multilateral system? No, we're not, but I'm not sure
whether the system may not have abandoned us.
COMMENT, Mr. Simon Reisman: There has been reference to the
relationship between the multilateral approach on the one hand and the
customs union/free-trade approach, which is provided for in Article
XXIV of the GAIT, on the other. This is the basis, presumably, of the
consideration being given to a possible comprehensive bilateral deal between Canada and the United States.
I was personally involved in the negotiations in Geneva in 1946 and
then in Havana in 1947, when Article XXIV was formulated. It had
been part of the Havana Charter and was taken out of that and put into
the GATT as one of the supporting provisions. There was, from the very
beginning, the possibility of inherent contradictions between the two
approaches.
The Havana Charter/GATT approach was Most Favored Nation
treatment, and it was to be nondiscriminatory. The customs union/free-
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trade idea seemed to contradict that, in the sense there would be almost
preferential arrangements between groups or pairs of countries. These
contradictions are more apparent today.
The Europeans, anticipating that they might wish to do something
among themselves, insisted that there be an article like Article XXIV. In
the first instance they were talking customs union only, the free-trade
part was added later. It was thought of in terms of creating a large unit
within which all barriers are removed and then trade takes place between
that larger unit and other large units. There are all kinds of opportunities for trade enhancement in that type of arrangement.
The United States saw it that way, I believe. The U.S. did not resist
the BENELUX approach, did not resist the Common Market, did not
resist EFTA (European Free Trade Area). I think the United States encouraged those arrangements.
But, the contradictions are apparent. When other countries say
Canada and the U.S. should not make their own free-trade area, it contradicts the history and development under that whole approach. And, if
one looks in terms of trade enhancement, and not trade restraint, these
approaches are not really contradictory at all.
QUESTION, Mr. Jon Fried: Mr. Merkin, my question relates to
what has been referred to as "contingency protectionism." On the one
hand, in the Quebec Declaration there is no explicit mention of contingency protectionism. On the other hand, secure and enhanced access
should mean, in the ideal world, that traders do not have to look over
their shoulders in fear of countervail and antidumping, or other trade
action, once they have access to markets. Is there any likelihood of the
Congress making any concessions or movement in this area?
ANSWER, Mr. Merkin: I have difficulty in talking about removing
the ability of any firm, whether Canadian or American, from taking action against an unfair trade practice. Both countries have defined the
dumping of goods, and unfair subsidization of goods for export, as illegal
practices. Both countries have countervail and antidumping laws. I
don't see any way the U.S. Congress, under a trade enhancement agreement, would do away with a company's ability to take countervail or
antidumping measures against a Canadian company.
There is a very strong perception in Congress, whether or not in
fact, that there are a great number of subsidies granted in Canada. The
lumber industry, the fishing industry, the pork industry-industry after
industry is blaming its trading problems on some sort of unfair practice.
As long as that perception remains, it is not possible to ask Congress to
abolish countervail or antidumping laws.
On the question of escape clauses, I think there may be more flexibility on the part of the Administration. Why should an action aimed at
Japan hit Canada if we have got a free-trade area (or vice-versa)? We
have a better chance of convincing Congress of the wisdom in changing
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the escape clause actions than changing the countervail or antidumping
rules.
ANSWER, The HonorableDonaldS. Macdonald: Safeguards are, of
course, a great concern. After all, the GATT itself recognizes that both
dumping and export subsidies are unfair trading practices. What causes
Canadians concern is the procedure in the United States that can be used
for harassment. What should be looked for, in that context, is a procedural code to guarantee that these questions would be dealt with expeditiously and fairly between the two countries. While countervailing duties
have not been used extensively in Canada, I think it's conceivable that
they could be of concern to American manufacturers.
COMMENT, Mr. Merkin: A related point that came up in the hearings we held on sectoral free-trade is the idea of a process in which success in a countervail or antidumping action would apply equally to the
opposite side. There are legal problems with this idea, since injury would
only be proved in one country and not the other. The point is, should
such a system be considered?
QUESTION, Mr. Robert Latimer: Mr. Merkin, the idea that you
would deal with the issue of countervailing duties and antidumping
outside the GATT system seems to me a little dangerous. You have to
look at that very carefully and weigh the concept of injury, because
dumping is not unfair if there is no injury. If you reject categorically the
idea of dealing with contingency protectionism in some way, such as antidumping or countervailance, then I think you will have a lot of trouble,
don't you?
ANSWER, Mr. Merkin: First of all, the subject has never been
raised by the Canadian government. Until it's raised and we see what
kind of proposals are being talked about, we're obviously receptive to any
discussion. From a political realist viewpoint, if we go to the Congress
and say we're waiving countervail and antidumping, I think the Congress
would throw us out. It's-one issue that must be supportable before Congress would even listen.
QUESTION, Professor Virginia Leary: Mr. Macdonald, could you
elaborate on the question of the implications of a free-trade agreement on
social policy?
ANSWER, The HonorableDonald S. Macdonald: There would be a
concern, in the most general terms, about a necessity to harmonize social
policies in the two countries to get them as identical as possible, so as to
harmonize the cost bases for industries. It may, for example, be necessary to depart from the government prepaid medical care in Canada and
move to a situation similar to the United States. The concern is that the
larger market is going to dictate the cost inputs.
There is also a related question of regional development policies.
(By the way, what Canada does through articulated regional development policies, the United States does by way of the defense budget.) We
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have a stipulation in the Constitution Act of 1982 that we're going to
equalize regional development opportunities across Canada. Therefore,
another part of the Canadian social policy is to meet that national criterion. And, these efforts to bring firms in the periphery of Canada up to
competitive levels with those in the center of Canada are going to be
regarded as export subsidies and, therefore, hit with a countervail when
those products go into the United States.
QUESTION,ProfessorKing: In terms of Canada and the impact on
workers, has there been any factoring in of the labor point of view on this
type of initiative? What type of reaction is there and what are the concerns on protection of workers if this type of trade agreement is adopted?
ANSWER, The HonorableDonald S. Macdonald: In general terms,
the Canadian Labor Congress regards without enthusiasm the notion of
moving any closer on trading relationships or anything that will bring
down barriers. That kind of adjustment will be very difficult for union
membership. The question has been much debated and by mid-summer,
when the Royal Commission report is published, these questions will be
more fully canvassed.
ANSWER, Mr. Merkin: On the U.S. side, the labor movement is
not particularly enthusiastic about removing barriers to trade coming
into the United States. And, given the fact that our market is ten times
the size of the Canadian market, I think they will not particularly support a bilateral approach. Up until now, the input of the Labor Department into trade policy decisions had been minimal, but I think the new
Secretary, Bill Brock, will have more to say on these matters.

